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Abstract
Global production networks (GPNs) connect multiple producers involved in fragmented manufacturing processes. Major 
brands and retailers, considered as lead firms, are under increasing pressure to ensure products made through GPNs are pro-
duced sustainably. Theories of governance developed to understand dynamics in outsourced production can provide insight 
into this issue. However, these theories and related empirical research have often focused on relationships between lead firms 
and upper-tier suppliers. When manufacturing involves multiple fragmented stages, understanding the role of lead firms 
becomes more difficult. This article considers new governance roles that lead firms, as buyers, are playing when attempting 
to promote sustainable practices across all stages of production for buyer-driven industries. The focus is exploring the nature 
of new governance approaches which lead firms have developed in order to address diverse sustainability challenges found 
within GPNs, particularly related to lower-tier suppliers. These approaches can involve lead firms working through vertical 
buyer–seller links or developing new horizontal relationships, which link lead firms with lower-tier suppliers and govern-
ance processes in these suppliers’ local productive systems. The findings draw from field research examining how top UK 
garment retailers provide governance to producers involved in creating cotton garments in India and a review of publicised 
policies and practices of these retailers related to promoting sustainable production. Five types of governance mechanisms 
that can involve vertical or horizontal links are identified. Considering the growth of new governance relationships expands 
previous conceptions of the roles of lead firm governance.
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Introduction
Contemporary manufacturing processes can involve lead 
firms identified with final products created through activi-
ties carried out by a network of suppliers each responsible 
for a different stage of production. With an understanding of 
sustainability challenges being created by processes which 
have harmful social or environmental impacts, behaviours 
of producers involved in any stage of production may con-
tribute to perpetuating such challenges. Developing a better 
understanding of the governance involved in shaping prac-
tices used in fragmented global production networks (GPNs) 
connected to widespread sustainability challenges is a press-
ing global concern.
As many products are made through what have been 
considered as lead firm-driven processes (Gereffi 1994), an 
important consideration is the role that lead buyers play. 
While fragmentation provides commercial benefits for lead 
firms, it also involves a loss of direct control over production 
practices. Without direct control, lead firms, which are under 
increasing pressure to be responsible for sustainability chal-
lenges at all stages of production (Schrempf-Stirling et al. 
2013), must develop strategies for influencing businesses 
producing their products. Davis et al. (2013) refer to the fact 
that increasing loss of control is taking place alongside an 
increase in the expectations for corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) as a ‘responsibility paradox’ and note that multi-
national firms are spreading their efforts to create positive 
social impact over a wider set of issues and locations. In this 
context, this article questions the roles that lead firms play 
in governance for sustainable production across fragmented 
production processes.
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Two gaps in literature on private governance for sustain-
able production are addressed. The first gap is that most 
research has focused on the relationship between lead firms 
and first-tier suppliers (Alexander 2018; Sauer and Seuring 
2018). Notably, relationships between lead firms and lower-
tier suppliers are under-researched (for key exceptions see 
Mena et al. 2013; Nadvi and Raj-Reichert 2015; Kim and 
Davis 2016). Important considerations when exploring chal-
lenges related to sustainability that extend to raw material 
production are that often a large set of globally fragmented 
suppliers are involved and lead firms may not have any direct 
connections to lower-tier suppliers.
The second gap considered is that previous research on 
processes of lead firm governance has focused on lead firms 
as standard setters (Locke 2013; Lund-Thomsen and Lind-
green 2014). Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen (2014) identify 
an evolution in the methods employed by lead firms seek-
ing to control suppliers related to CSR issues. They out-
line the existence of a dominant compliance paradigm and 
the development of a cooperation paradigm which involves 
lead firms collaborating with their suppliers related to CSR 
issues. However, more research is needed to better under-
stand the variety of mechanisms that lead firms use to govern 
suppliers’ behaviour.
To explore these topics, this paper considers production 
as taking place within a GPN that includes all actors rel-
evant to supporting production processes, such as support 
service providers and government agencies (Henderson et al. 
2002; Coe and Yeung 2015). The GPN framework explicitly 
emphasises that all actors have embedded network, territo-
rial and societal locations that shape their behaviour (Hess 
2004). Within this network, the set of businesses involved in 
the creation of a product is considered as an extended sup-
plier network (ESN) (Alexander 2018). The ESN’s structure 
is formed by the diverse and intersecting vertical pathways 
created by buyer–seller links involving producers of compo-
nent parts and intermediary inputs. The analysis in this paper 
focuses on how lead firms sitting at the top of ESNs seek 
to influence producers’ practices. A case study network is 
explored that involves UK retailers sourcing cotton garments 
from Indian producers. Within this network, approaches that 
retailers are using to address challenges with sustainable 
production are classified and analysed.
In the context of sitting at the top of a complicated 
set of vertical pathways with limited scope to transmit 
vertical governance pressures, this article argues that lead 
firms play multiple governance roles. Within conventional 
commercial relationships, lead firms have limited con-
nections to lower-tier producers. However, lead firms are 
overcoming this challenge by developing new governance 
approaches. Lead firms were found to use both vertical 
and horizontal governance paths in efforts to address sus-
tainability challenges (Alexander 2018). Vertical pathways 
involve lead firms seeking to control suppliers through 
buyer–seller links. This can be limited to lead firms’ rela-
tionships to first-tier suppliers or involve pressures that are 
expected to filter down through vertical links to lower-tier 
suppliers. Horizontal pathways involve lead firms creating 
governance relationships outside of vertical commercial 
connections. Horizontal connections can be developed 
through creating new interfirm relationships or creating 
relationships with other governance actors playing roles in 
the territorial locations where production takes place, such 
as NGOs or multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs).
With their use observed across both types of pathways, 
five mechanisms for lead firm governance for sustainabil-
ity are identified. These mechanisms are defined as Hier-
archical, Compliance, Support Services, Partnership and 
Promotion of Voluntary Change. All five mechanisms may 
be used simultaneously by a single lead firm. The ability to 
use each approach is shaped by the relationship lead firms 
have with producers and the nature of the sustainability 
challenges being faced.
This study uses a GPN approach to understand chal-
lenges lead firms face with CSR in their supplier networks. 
Specifically, it provides a deeper understanding of the gov-
ernance roles lead firms play across fragmented networks 
of suppliers drawing in under-researched connections with 
lower-tier suppliers. The diversity of roles played by lead 
firms within this case study provides a new understand-
ing of the process of buyer-driven governance. Lead firms 
are found to play multiple simultaneous governance roles. 
Overall, buyer-led governance across the case study was 
found to be a limited process, with few connections found 
between lead firms and lower-tier suppliers. However, the 
role of UK garment retailers in governance for sustainable 
production is expanding.
The focus of this paper differs from much research 
on  sustainable supply chain managment (SSCM) that 
focuses on success from a lead firm perspective, which 
can be measured by decreasing their risk (Sauer and Seur-
ing 2018). Instead, this paper emphasises how pressures 
are experienced in local productive systems experiencing 
sustainability challenges. The analysis provided on the two 
governance pathways and five governance mechanisms can 
help practitioners develop better interventions that may be 
able to create longer-term embedded changes within local 
production systems.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The sec-
ond section reviews relevant research seeking to under-
stand dynamics of fragmented production systems, pro-
cesses of buyer-driven governance and lead firms’ efforts 
to promote sustainable production practices. The third 
section discusses the methodology. The fourth section 
presents the empirical results found within the case study. 
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The fifth section discusses the results. The sixth section 
provides a conclusion.
Buyer‑Driven Governance for Fragmented 
Production
Sustainable systems have been seen to rely on an inter-
dependence of practices related to social, economic and 
environmental issues (Carter and Rogers 2008; Sumner 
2005). Challenges with achieving the objective of sus-
tainable production are connected to all three issues. 
This objective has been explored through socioeconomic 
research in geography and sociology which has looked at 
production taking place in systems known as global com-
modity chains (GCCs), global value chains (GVCs) and 
GPNs and through business-focused research in the field 
of supply chain management (SCM). This study builds on 
these socioeconomic frameworks and draws insight from 
SSCM research.
GCC, GVC and GPN literature seeks to understand 
global economic systems. Studies using these concepts 
have often focused on lead firms located in Western 
countries relying on businesses in low-wage countries. 
Issues considered have included how profits are distrib-
uted between businesses connected in multiple stages of 
producing one product, local implications of businesses 
connecting to global networks and the evolution of global 
standards (Gereffi and Lee 2012; Bair and Werner 2015). 
Much of this research has focused on exploring the gov-
ernance roles played by lead firms.
SCM literature has focused on the relationships between 
firms and first-tier suppliers. However, recent research, 
particularly studies looking at SSCM, has started to 
explore connections between lead firms and lower-tier sup-
pliers (e.g. Mena et al. 2013; Tachizawa and Wong 2014; 
Sauer and Seuring 2018). Research from this field has used 
multiple organisational theories to investigate dynamics 
involved in the connections between lead firms and their 
suppliers (Sarkis et al. 2011).
The first part of this section reviews frameworks used to 
conceptualise fragmented production processes. The sec-
ond part discusses theories of governance that have been 
used to understand relationships in fragmented production. 
The third part considers perspectives from SSCM litera-
ture than can help to explore interfirm relationships. The 
fourth part presents key insights from the emerging litera-
ture which explicitly focuses on understanding dynamics 
that connect multiple tiers of suppliers.
Conceptualising Fragmented Production Systems
Three major frameworks have been used to explore glob-
ally fragmented production from a socio-economic per-
spective. The GVC perspective, developed in the 1990s, 
evolved from the GCC approach. By looking at the organi-
sational field that developed in post-World War II pro-
duction systems, the GCC approach provided a way to 
understand the importance of businesses as actors shaping 
people’s lives globally (Bair 2008). Gereffi (1994) pro-
posed that lead firms, which are the most profitable firms 
in an industry, govern GCCs by controlling access to major 
resources such as product design, new technologies, brand 
names or consumer demand.
The GVC framework focuses more specifically on inter-
firm relationships. GVCs have been defined as incorporat-
ing “the full range of activities that are required to bring a 
product from its conception, through the different phases of 
production to end use and beyond (Pietrobelli and Saliola 
2008, p. 950)”. This approach has often been used to under-
stand power differentials between lead firms and businesses 
that are seen to be dependent on lead firms (Gereffi et al. 
2005; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001).
The GPN framework, developed based on a geographi-
cal perspective, has been defined as, “an organisational 
arrangement, comprising interconnected economic and 
non-economic actors, coordinated by a global lead firm 
and producing goods or services across multiple geo-
graphical locations for worldwide markets (Coe and 
Yeung 2015, pp. 1–2)”. This framework seeks to cover 
all relevant sets of actors and relationships (Coe et al. 
2008). While definitions of the GCC and GVC frame-
works have incorporated non-firm actors and territori-
ality, research framed under these approaches has often 
focused on interfirm relationships (Coe and Yeung 2015). 
Compared to these frameworks, the GPN approach more 
strongly emphasises considering factors outside direct 
buyer–seller relationships, with GPNs having been con-
sidered to be economic, political, social and cultural 
phenomena (Levy 2008; Coe et  al. 2008). The GPN 
framework involves three conceptual categories and four 
conceptual dimensions (Henderson et al. 2002; Coe and 
Yeung 2015). The conceptual categories include value 
(creation, enhancement, capture), power (corporate, col-
lective and institutional) and embeddedness (territorial, 
network and societal). The conceptual dimensions include 
firms (ownership, “architecture”), sectors (technologies 
and products/markets), networks (“architecture”, power 
configuration and governance) and institutions (gov-
ernmental, quasi-governmental, non-governmental). 
Governance pressures in GPNs are seen not merely as 
functioning through top down processes but involving 
“dynamically inter-connected and simultaneous processes 
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(p. 273)” with asymmetrical power relationships (Coe 
et al. 2008). An important understanding coming out of 
the GPN approach is the evolutionary nature of networks. 
Network structures are seen to be shaped by processes of 
path dependency and dynamic competitive drivers (Hen-
derson et al. 2002; Coe and Yeung 2015).
Alternate models exist which also look at supply chains 
as networks. One such theory is social network theory, 
which focuses on the structure of a network as determining 
the behaviour of its members (Borgatti and Li 2009). The 
GPN conception of network differs from social network 
theory in that it looks at individual actors as having agency 
and making decisions based on multiple socioeconomic 
factors.
Another way of viewing supplier networks is to concep-
tualise them as complex adaptive systems (CASs) (Choi 
et al. 2001). This approach draws from systems theory, 
which considers components of a system to be best under-
stood within the system rather than alone and from com-
plexity theory, which involves considering that reactions 
in complex systems are difficult to predict (Tachizawa and 
Wong 2014). These systems are seen as being made up 
of agents whose individual decisions interact within the 
overall system through processes that can lead to the emer-
gence of new structures, patterns and properties that were 
not pre-planned by any one agent.
The broad field of SCM explores relationships between 
lead firms and suppliers. Approaches used have involved 
agency theory, balance theory, complexity theory, ecologi-
cal modernisation theory, information theory, institutional 
theory, network focused perspectives, path dependency, 
relational view, resource based view, resource dependence 
theory, social embeddedness, stakeholder theory, systems 
theory and transaction cost economics (Sarkis et al. 2011; 
Tachizawa and Wong 2014). One key difference between 
SCM literature and GPN literature is the latter looks at 
societal relationships with businesses seen as one of many 
actors in a system, whereas the former tends to focus on 
firms as the key actor and the outside world as something 
that the firm interacts with. Another key difference is that 
SCM literature has played limited attention to local con-
text (Sauer and Seuring 2018).
While the multiple frameworks described above can be 
used for answering questions about fragmented produc-
tion, this study uses a GPN approach because it provides 
a way to explore behaviour of all actors involved in shap-
ing production processes and considers non-linear dynam-
ics along with the importance of embeddedness. In propos-
ing the GPN framework, Henderson et al. (2002) explicitly 
say that looking at firms is beneficial for exploring pos-
sibilities of economic development. This study contributes 
to research which has expanded this potential by using the 
framework to also incorporate social and environmental 
issues.
Lead Firm Governance over Fragmented Production
Several theories have been developed to explain processes 
through which lead firms govern producers. A key insight 
was the classification of production processes as buyer or 
producer driven (Gereffi 1994). Buyer-driven industries gen-
erally have brands and retailers as lead firms and producer-
driven industries have manufacturers as lead firms. This arti-
cle focuses on dynamics that can be found in buyer-driven 
industries.
Buyer-driven governance was identified as taking place 
in industries which relied on a dispersed set of producers as 
suppliers. This outsourcing provides some advantages, such 
as increased flexibility; however, it also results in a loss of 
ability to directly control the practices used during produc-
tion processes. In buyer-driven industries, lead firms main-
tain control of high-value activities such as branding and 
marketing. It has been argued that all industries are moving 
towards a buyer-driven model (Gibbon et al. 2008).
Focusing on lead firms’ abilities to control first-tier 
suppliers, Gereffi et al. (2005) developed a framework 
that identified five forms of buyer governance. In this 
framework, the role played by buyers is determined by 
the complexity of transactions, codifiability of informa-
tion and capability of suppliers. Various combinations of 
these factors are seen as resulting in five types of network 
governance processes: markets, modular value chains, 
relational value chains, captive value chains and hierarchy. 
Market connections involve price-based transactions and 
have low costs of switching between suppliers. Modular 
connections involve suppliers creating products based on 
a buyer’s design specifications. Relational connections 
feature mutual dependence and are likely to involve fam-
ily or ethnic ties, benefit from spatial proximity or rely 
on trust and reputation with long-term relationships. Cap-
tive connections generally involve small suppliers highly 
dependent on larger buyers that employ a high degree of 
monitoring and control. Hierarchy involves complete verti-
cal integration.
Moving beyond earlier governance conceptions focused 
on exploring dynamics related to competition, researchers 
have begun to explore topics related to lead buyers’ roles in 
governance for sustainability. Some types of lead firms in 
some sectors have faced pressures to promote sustainability 
for outsourced production (Brown and Knudsen 2015). Fac-
ing such pressure, many garment brands and retailers devel-
oped CSR policies in the 1990s, which often involved devel-
oping codes of conduct for their suppliers (Bartley 2003; 
O’Rourke 2003). These compliance-based initiatives have 
since become widespread with sourcing policies generally 
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focused on first-tier suppliers (O’Rourke 2003; Welford and 
Frost 2006). In exploring how lead firms seek to govern their 
first-tier suppliers related to sustainability challenges, Lund-
Thomsen and Lindgreen (2014) distinguished between two 
paradigms as the dominant compliance paradigm and the 
emerging cooperative paradigm. The cooperative paradigm 
is seen to involve buyers questioning their own role in driv-
ing sustainability challenges, sharing in the responsibility for 
addressing challenges and reforming auditing systems to get 
a better understanding of production practices.
Interfirm Dynamics in SSCM Literature
SSCM literature has employed multiple theories to under-
stand relationships and dynamics between actors in frag-
mented production. SCM studies have mainly looked at 
dyadic relationships but some have looked at triads involv-
ing either one buyer and two first-tier suppliers or a buyer, 
a first-tier and a second-tier supplier (Tachizawa and Wong 
2014). However, more recent research, which is considered 
below, has begun to apply these theories to look at multi-tier 
relationships.
One theory that has been used to look at buyer–seller 
relationships in both the GVC approach and in SCM litera-
ture is transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979, 1981). 
Building on the make versus buy logic developed by Coase 
(1937), this theory postulates that firms make decisions 
about whether to keep activities vertically integrated or to 
outsource them through considering costs based on uncer-
tainty, frequency and the investments required. Asset speci-
ficity, defined as whether these investments are specific to a 
particular transaction or can also be used for other purposes, 
is considered as a key factor of investment. Additionally this 
theory highlights two behavioural assumptions as acknowl-
edging that humans have bounded rationality and some are 
prone to opportunism. Baker et al. (2002) supplemented 
this theory through the introduction of the option for coop-
eration. Transaction costs can be important to assess when 
looking at commercial relationships related to sustainability 
challenges, as adding responsibility for managing sustain-
ability challenges into transaction decisions can change the 
balance of costs and benefits for outsourcing (Sarkis et al. 
2011).
SCM research also highlights interdependence buyers and 
suppliers can have on each other and draws attention to the 
fact that lead firms cannot always take unilateral decisions. 
Research using a relational view considers inter-organisa-
tional connections as a way to get access to critical network 
resources (Dyer and Singh 1998). A related perspective is 
resource dependency theory, which sees firms as requiring 
critical resources from their suppliers, such as standards, 
technologies, materials and distribution channels (Tachizawa 
and Wong 2014).
Within SCM research two further theories are useful for 
helping to understand how firms interact with each other. 
Information theory, considering information asymmetry 
and signalling (Sarkis et al. 2011), is a concept that is rel-
evant when looking at interactions between diverse actors. 
Additionally, agency theory can be used to explore incen-
tive mechanisms (Carter and Rogers 2008; Tachizawa and 
Wong 2014).
Lead Firm Governance Across Multi‑tier Supplier 
Relationships
While early research on lead-firm governance focused on 
relationships between lead firms and first-tier suppliers, a 
growing body of research on sustainability challenges is 
emerging that considers relationships across multiple tiers. 
SSCM studies using this approach can be roughly divided 
into those that explore types of connections and those that 
consider mechanisms that promote change.
Mena et al. (2013) identified three forms of connections 
between lead firms and second-tier suppliers in multi-tier 
SSCM (MT-SSCM) as open, meaning there is not a direct 
relationship, transitional, meaning a link is being devel-
oped and closed, meaning that a formal relationship exists. 
Tachizawa and Wong (2014) provide further insight into 
understanding the types of connections that lead firms can 
use to govern lower-tier suppliers by identifying four basic 
approaches as ‘Direct’, ‘Indirect’, ‘Work with Third Parties’ 
and ‘Don’t Bother’. Grimm et al. (2014) identify notable dif-
ferences in lead firm connections with lower-tiers compared 
to direct suppliers as involving a lack of contractual relation-
ship, limited ability to exert direct pressure and incomplete 
knowledge of identities of lower-tier suppliers.
Another perspective is provided by Hofstetter (2018) 
who identifies five approaches for how lead firms can con-
nect to lower-tier suppliers in MT-SSCM. One is having 
the first-tier supplier take responsibility. The second is con-
necting directly to the lower-tier supplier without involving 
the upper-tier supplier. The third is interacting jointly with 
the upper and lower-tier supplier. The fourth is attempting 
to influence the lower-tier supplier’s local environment. 
The fifth is changing the structure of the supply chain to 
develop a formal, direct link with the lower-tier supplier. The 
most popular approach identified by Hofsetter was work-
ing through first-tier suppliers. Hofstetter posits that lead 
firms generally only take the second or third approach as 
a last resort. The fourth approach can be used when major 
issues arise that concern whole regions and can often involve 
working with partners, such as NGOs or other lead firms. 
The fifth approach can be a drastic step but can help to deal 
 R. Alexander 
1 3
with persistent challenges and create benefits compared to 
competitors that do not have such direct connections.
When considering how lead firms can influence lower-
tier suppliers from a MT-SSCM perspective, Klassen and 
Vereecke (2012) identify two main capabilities from exist-
ing research as monitoring and collaboration, and identify 
a third option, through their empirical research, as inno-
vation. They consider innovation capabilities as focusing 
on developing new processes within the supply chain that 
bring in new stakeholders. Tachizawa and Wong’s (2014) 
connection types were associated with different influence 
mechanisms. ‘Direct’ involves providing specific require-
ments that lower-tier suppliers must meet, choosing lower-
tier suppliers, sharing information directly with lower-tier 
suppliers or providing assistance, such as training, running 
conferences or carrying out joint applied research. ‘Indirect’ 
approaches involve giving requirements to first-tier suppliers 
or requiring third-party certification for lower-tier suppliers. 
‘Working with Third Parties’ can involve supporting first-
tier suppliers to develop monitoring systems for lower-tier 
suppliers, using third-party information to monitor lower-tier 
suppliers, collaborating with NGOs or competitors or dele-
gating responsibility to a third party. ‘Don’t Bother’ involves 
having limited information about lower-tier suppliers and not 
seeking to change their behaviour.
To better understand MT-SSCM, Sauer and Seuring 
(2018) recently employed a perspective that aligns closely 
with GPN research. They draw attention to the need to look 
at the multiple institutional environments that exist across 
fragmented production processes. A challenge illustrated by 
this perspective is that when there are multiple distinct rela-
tionships between a lead firm and lower-tier suppliers, there 
may not be a common relational space. They see suppliers 
as active agents that may be in situations requiring reactions 
to potentially conflicting institutional pressures. Such situ-
ations can cause suppliers to decouple from supply chain 
structures not compatible with local pressures. In contrast, 
similar institutional pressure from vertical and horizontal 
sources facilitates compliance and cooperation.
While the buyer-driven governance perspective, which is 
prominent in GVC/GPN research, claims that lead firms gov-
ern entire supply chains, the processes through which this 
governance occurs have not been explored in-depth. Ponte 
and Sturgeon (2014) highlighted the importance of looking 
at diverse relationship across micro links involving com-
mercial relationships between multiple tiers of buyers and 
suppliers. They question the role of lead buyers as driving 
all stages of production and introduce the idea of a spectrum 
from unipolar governance, with production driven by one 
key actor, to multi-polar governance, involving a variety of 
governance actors.
Within a GPN framework, a model that can facilitate the 
analysis of governance flows across fragmented production 
processes is provided by Alexander (2018). This approach 
identifies key structures that are important to consider in 
ESNs as the identities of the actors at the top of the network, 
the types of vertical links that connect network members, 
the types of businesses involved as producers and the loca-
tions of network members. These considerations are seen 
as important for understanding why particular production 
practices are being used and how to promote changes. A 
key insight from this perspective is that, within an ESN, 
groups of producers within the same local productive system 
can have similar experiences and sustainability challenges 
and the converse that groups of producers in the same ESN 
working in different local productive systems can have dif-
ferent experiences and sustainability challenges.
While many insights can be drawn from SSCM literature, 
this paper is based in a GPN perspective. A key difference is 
that SSCM perspectives often consider sustainability from 
the perspective of the lead firm. This study however, looks at 
sustainability across the entire network. This involves ques-
tioning who defines sustainability challenges and whether 
potential interventions will feasibly address challenges and 
not just shift problems to different locations.
Methodology
This article is based on a qualitative case study, with the 
case defined as a network of interconnected lead firms 
and suppliers. Having a network as a case study provides 
an approach which differs from much research on SSCM 
as most empirical studies have focused on lead firms’ and 
often not looked at even first-tier suppliers (Carter and Eas-
ton 2011). The main research question is as follows: Facing 
pressure to support sustainable production, how do garment 
sector retailers provide governance for sustainability across 
their fragmented ESNs? To answer this question, the paper 
considers how lead firms connect to members of their ESNs 
and the strategies they use to promote change.
Addressing the issue of sustainable production in the 
ESNs of cotton garments is important because of the large-
scale global impact of these networks’ production processes. 
Cotton garment production can broadly be considered as 
being divided into cotton production, textile production 
and garment production. Millions of people worldwide are 
directly employed by these industries and even more feel 
the impacts when unsustainable practices are used. Specific 
social and environmental challenges in cotton garment pro-
duction include occupational health and safety concerns, 
child labour, instability of income, discrimination of workers 
by gender and other classifications, high levels of water and 
chemical inputs in fibre production and textile treatments, 
improperly managed waste disposal, volatile commodity 
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markets and a hugely uneven distribution of gains through 
the value chain.
The specific case study explored is the network involved 
in UK retailers sourcing cotton garments in India. UK retail-
ers were chosen because of their prominent role in global 
garment sourcing practices. In 2012, the UK was the fourth 
largest global importer of clothing (UN Statistics Division 
2015). Additionally, UK retailers have been major players 
in global efforts to address sustainability challenges within 
garment production.
Within the UK, the bulk of clothing is sold by a small 
number of large retailers. This study focuses on the top 20 
businesses contributing to UK clothing sales in 2012. These 
firms were responsible for 58% of national sales (Mintel 
2013). Exploring the governance roles played by these firms 
provides insight into governance processes that cover a large 
set of producers.
As UK garment retailers often share the same suppliers, 
this study looks at a set of producers that are part of an inter-
connected ESN responsible for production for the same set 
of retailers. Production in India is focused on for multiple 
reasons. As one of the UK’s top five sources of cotton garment 
imports, India is an important supplier of cotton clothing for 
the UK (UN Statistics Division 2015). Additionally, India pro-
vides a location where all stages of production occur within 
one country, which was important for being able to carry out 
the field work with the resources available.
The findings were developed through progressive focus-
ing, an approach that involves “systematic narrowing and 
refinement of the research focus during fieldwork in order 
to accommodate highly unique and specific issues (emic) 
of socio-cultural behaviour (Parlett and Hamilton 1972; 
Stake 2010) (pp. 818–819)”, which can facilitate theory 
refinement (Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012). This involved a 
thorough review of relevant literature and collecting a large 
volume of empirical data and then consulting additional lit-
erature as patterns started to become apparent through the 
data analysis process. This approach helped to tie together 
the emerging qualitative empirical findings with debates in 
relevant literature.
Two main sources of data were used for this study (see 
Table 1). The first involved field research in the UK and 
India. This included a series of semi-structured interviews 
with representatives of garment retailers, their suppliers and 
other individuals connected to and knowledgeable about the 
case study network. A total of 98 interviews were conducted 
in the UK and India in 2013. Additionally, eight industry 
events in the UK and India were attended from 2012 to 2014.
Representatives of the UK’s 2012 top selling garment 
retailers and members of their ESNs were approached as 
potential interviewees. In order to identify producers to 
approach for interviews, it was necessary to attempt to 
map out the businesses involved in the Indian portion of 
the case study retailers’ ESN. Manufacturing cotton cloth-
ing involves multiple activities, with major steps including 
cotton farming, cotton ginning, yarn spinning, weaving or 
knitting textiles and garment manufacturing. Wet process-
ing (which includes activities such as bleaching and dying) 
is also a key step that can be conducted at varying points 
in the production process and can be integrated in facilities 
carrying out other activities or conducted by independent 
service providers. Mapping businesses involved with these 
tasks included reviewing available data on trade flows of 
intermediary products used in making cotton garments, 
interviewing experts and asking identified ESN members 
in India about their buyers and suppliers. These inquiries 
revealed a large and complex ESN for which the resources 
were not available to completely map. However, locations 
where large amounts of production take place were identi-
fied and interviews were conducted with businesses in these 
areas. As lower-tier producers did not know the end users of 
their products, companies were interviewed in areas where 
it was likely that outputs were contributing to production 
for the case study retailers. Interviews were conducted with 
representatives from three top 20 UK retailers, five sourcing 
Table 1  Data sources
5 interviews with representatives of 3 retailers
66 interviews with 57 ESN suppliers
 • 7 interviews with 5 first-tier sourcing intermediaries who have known connections to 12 of the UK’s 2012 top 20 retailers
 • 5 interviews with 5 lower-tier intermediaries
 • 54 interviews with 47 producers (businesses engaged in cotton farming, ginning, yarn spinning, textile manufacturing, garment manufactur-
ing and wet processing services)
27 interviews with additional stakeholders (industry support service providers, NGOs, government officials and other knowledgeable informants)
Attending 8 industry events
Available annual reports, sustainability reports and websites of the UK’s 2012 top 20 retailers (Arcadia Group, Asda, Debenhams, H&M, House 
of Fraser, JD Sports, John Lewis, Marks & Spencer, Matalan, N Brown, New Look, Next, Primark, River Island, Sainsbury’s, Shop Direct, 
Tesco, The Edinburgh Woollen Mill Group) from 2013 to 2015
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firms that work for multiple firms among the UK’s top 20 
retailers, 5 lower-tier sourcing intermediaries and 47 produc-
ers. Supplier interviews included businesses involved in all 
stages of production.
Interviews were semi-structured and approximately 
45 minutes long. They were based on lists of pre-defined 
topics customised for each type of interviewee and modi-
fied as the research progressed and new topics of interest 
emerged. Using a method of inquiry based on institutional 
ethnography, the approach used in the interviews focused 
on learning about a global network through the informants’ 
lived experiences (Smith 2005; Ng and Mirchandani 2008). 
Seventy-two of the interviews were conducted by the pri-
mary researcher in English and 26 of the interviews were 
conducted in regional languages (Hindi, Gujarati and Tamil) 
by interpreters in the presence of the primary researcher. 
While most of the interviews were conducted in person, 11 
of the interviews were conducted over the phone or through 
Skype. Interviews were recorded with the consent of par-
ticipants.1 The English recordings were transcribed directly. 
The interviews conducted in other languages were translated 
and transcribed into English. Independent speakers of the 
original languages were hired to check the accuracy of the 
translations.
The second source of data was sustainability-related 
material published from 2013 to 2015 by the 20 retailers 
included in the case. Texts reviewed included content pub-
lished on websites, annual reports and sustainability-focused 
reports. This material was chosen as it provided an overview 
of recent activities being carried out and planned.
These sources of data provided rich qualitative informa-
tion about firms’ practices. A systematic and trustworthy 
approach to data analysis was facilitated by using computer 
software (Sinkovics et al. 2008). Transcripts and texts pro-
duced by retailers were reviewed and coded using NVivo 
with a focus on identifying instances where lead firms were 
found to be influencing or attempting to influence practices 
of suppliers. Separate instances were subsequently grouped 
into the five distinct governance mechanisms presented in 
this article. The groups were developed through an iterative 
process of analysing the findings and reviewing theories in 
literature. In the reported findings, interviewees’ identities 
are kept confidential but firms’ names are mentioned when 
information is derived from secondary sources.
Lead Firms’ Governance Across Their 
Extended Supplier Networks
This study identifies two key elements of lead firm gov-
ernance for sustainability. The first is the type of path 
connecting lead firms to producers. The second is a set of 
mechanisms used to promote change. This section presents 
empirical results related to both elements.
Governance Pathways
Businesses in India responsible for different stages of cot-
ton garment production are variously vertically integrated 
and fragmented. For example, one business may carry out 
multiple tasks, such as yarn spinning and textile weaving or 
can be limited to one task. Each business generally sells to 
multiple buyers and sources from multiple suppliers creating 
a complex network of vertical connections. In efforts to pro-
mote sustainable production, retailers in the case study were 
found to use both vertical connections, found in existing 
buyer–seller relationships, and horizontal connections, pur-
posefully created to address sustainability challenges, with 
actors in the local productive systems of lower-tier suppli-
ers. Figure 1 illustrates examples of vertical and horizontal 
governance pathways for a cotton garment ESN and Table 2 
outlines possible vertical and horizontal connections that can 
be used during lead firm governance processes. 
Lead Firms and Vertical Governance
There are two ways that lead firms can promote sustainable 
processes in the early stages of production through their ver-
tical sourcing relationships. One involves trying to promote 
changes through multiple connections in fragmented verti-
cal pathways. The other is through working with vertically 
integrated suppliers.
Fragmented Vertical Pathways Garment production in India 
is typically carried out through fragmented vertical path-
ways, with intermediary components of garments passing 
through multiple buyer–seller relationships. A fundamental 
challenge with this type of system is that lead buyers do not 
have direct commercial connections to lower-tier suppliers. 
A particular challenge with information flowing through 
these paths in this case is that, in the lower-tiers, many 
transactions involve limited to no connection between buy-
ers and suppliers. Some transactions are carried out through 
intermediaries and others involve auctions. These sales are 
usually based on observable product qualities.
Adding process requirements to the sales of these prod-
ucts would be in effect turning them into credence goods, 
which are items that are considered to have value based on 1 Three interviews were not audio recorded due to unforeseen cir-
cumstances. Detailed notes were taken.
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qualities that cannot be directly observed by a buyer (Fed-
dersen and Gilligan 2001; Darby and Karni 1973). A chal-
lenge with credence goods is the inability for a buyer to 
directly assess the credence values. To pass information on 
about unobservable qualities, each transaction could involve 
providing assurances to each subsequent buyer or new certi-
fication systems could be developed.
Currently, at a small scale, there are some early-stage 
inputs specifically identified as having more sustainable 
production processes flowing through top retailers’ ESNs. 
However, these are often niche product lines, such as organic 
or recycled cotton. Monitoring production for these products 
and their movement through supplier networks is currently 
costly as it often involves dedicated monitoring for trace-
ability and consumers usually pay a premium to cover these 
costs. Expansion of certifications for lower-tier production 
for all cotton garment inputs would require dramatic upscal-
ing of certification processes. This would be very chal-
lenging as can be seen by the failed attempt of Marks and 
Spencer to carry out a traceability programme that solely 
involved tracking intermediary stages of cotton garment pro-
duction without instigating changes in production practices. 
The company hired to perform this exercise attributed the 
failure to the complexity of the network and the informality 
of trading relationships in global cotton garment production 
(Barrie 2014).
However, several of the case study retailers were found to be 
expanding their code of conduct requirements to cover second-
tier suppliers such as laundries, embroidery units and packag-
ing suppliers. These policies represent an expansion of UK 
retailers’ previous focus on first-tier garment manufacturing.
One example of this development is Marks and Spencer’s 
2014 policy for addressing issues related to pollution in wet 
processing. This policy may be difficult to enact as a repre-
sentative from a retailer interviewed for this study indicated 
that wet processing firms have historically been resistant 
to lead firms’ inspections (Retailer A, India-based CSR-
focused representative). Making changes to waste treatment 
Fig. 1  Vertical and horizontal 
governance in a cotton garment 
extended supplier network
Table 2  Vertical and horizontal 
governance pathways Vertical pathways Horizontal pathways
Highly fragmented pathways Direct to lower-tier producers
Connections to vertically integrated producers Connections to governance actors in local regions
Presenting information publically (online)
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facilities can be expensive and firms may not be willing to 
invest in these changes depending on what proportion of 
their potential output would be affected by such require-
ments. Additionally, as retailers do not have direct contracts 
with wet processors that are not integrated into textile or 
garment production and Marks and Spencer’s policy requires 
the wet processors to provide proof of their own third-party 
certification, space is created for corruption.
A second example of a vertical approach being used to 
address sustainability challenges in second-tier suppliers can 
be found in retailers attempting to regulate working condi-
tions for homeworkers who can be responsible for irregular 
activities carried out by hand for garments that are made in 
factories, such as beadwork. One interviewee described the 
expansion of retailers’ policies in this area as follows,
We are working on issues such as homeworkers, where 
the beads and the sequins get attached on womens 
wear dresses and tops which are being outsourced by 
the manufacturers out to the homes through subcon-
tractors… we actually go out to those people also and 
go out to the homes and ensure that the code of prac-
tice is implemented there also (Retailer A, India-based 
CSR-focused representative).
Another way that lead firms can shape production prac-
tices of lower-tier suppliers is through processes of nomina-
tion. In nominated production, retailers directly choose the 
inputs that their contracted garment manufacturer will use. 
In these cases, retailers may have direct contact with lower-
tier producers and can require the producers to pass code-of-
conduct inspections. However, nomination of fabric sources 
is not very common in the Indian context (AEPC 2009).
In many industries companies often do not know which 
businesses are involved in lower-tiers of production. Limited 
information can flow between firms, particularly when it 
comes to sensitive issues and small firms may not have the 
resources to comply with disclosure requirements (Kim and 
Davis 2016). Tracking inputs down to raw material is dif-
ficult for many products. In an empirical study on conflict 
minerals, Kim and Davis (2016) found that most companies 
they spoke to in 2014 and 2016 were unable to determine the 
country of origin of some of their minerals.
Vertically Integrated First‑Tier Suppliers In contrast to using 
highly fragmented production processes, lead firms have the 
option to work with vertically integrated producers. While 
this model was found in the field work for this case study, it 
is rare in India. For lead firms, connecting to vertically inte-
grated producers can limit the risk associated with the loss 
of control created by fragmented production without losing 
the benefit of flexibility created by not directly owning pro-
duction facilities. Such systems allow for easier monitor-
ing of activities at earlier stages of production compared to 
highly fragmented production.
A challenge with this type of connection is that verti-
cally integrated suppliers may have business structures that 
rely on production activities taking place across multiple 
locations, with separate management teams using different 
practices. Major UK retailers have sustainability policies, 
such as codes of conduct, which are expected to be enforced 
for first-tier suppliers. When working with vertically inte-
grated suppliers, these suppliers in theory would be expected 
to uphold retailers’ sustainability policies for all stages of 
production carried out in-house. However, vertically inte-
grated producers in India carrying out production at different 
sites have been found to only have monitoring and certifica-
tion for their garment manufacturing facilities (Theuws and 
Overeem 2014).
A benefit of working with vertically integrated suppliers 
is that large first-tier suppliers can partner with lead firms 
to address sustainability issues among lower-tier suppliers. 
This model is found in the relationship between Retailer B 
and Composite Mill A who have developed a partnership to 
promote sustainable cotton farming processes. Retailer B is a 
UK department store. Composite Mill A is a vertically inte-
grated Indian producer that internally carries out spinning, 
weaving and garment-manufacturing activities, known as a 
composite mill. Through this partnership, Composite Mill 
A supports programmes that train farmers on more sustain-
able practices and directly buys the cotton and pays for gins 
to process it.
While this project has been relatively successful, the pro-
gramme involves a high level of commitment and work for 
Composite Mill A. Within Composite Mill A, the project 
is run by a department that has been set up specifically to 
focus on sustainable cotton. This type of programme is pos-
sible due to the large size of Composite Mill A with 25,000 
employees and their vertically integrated business structure. 
Additionally, Retailer B is a brand that places large orders, 
includes sustainable production as a large part of its mar-
keting strategy and has been willing to invest a significant 
amount of work into this project. While commercial pres-
sures have historically encouraged outsourcing and highly 
fragmented production, it is possible that needs related to 
sustainable production could create increasing pressures for 
vertical integration.
Lead Firms and Horizontal Governance
Lead firms are developing new types of non-sourcing con-
nections in efforts to address sustainability challenges at 
different stages of production. These can include direct 
connections to lower-tier producers, working with partners 
connected to local productive systems housing lower-tier 
producers or creating public campaigns seeking to reach 
Emerging Roles of Lead Buyer Governance for Sustainability Across Global Production Networks 
1 3
lower-tier producers. Governance in these connections is 
less formalised than sourcing policies and often is limited 
to individual projects.
Direct interfirm connections between retailers and lower-
tier producers to address sustainability issues were not found 
in the research for this study. However, this does not mean 
that these connections do not exist. The examples discussed 
below involve retailers connecting to lower-tiers through 
building connections to governance actors in local produc-
tive systems and through creating public campaigns targeted 
at lower-tier producers.
Lead Firms Connecting to  Governance Actors in  Local Pro‑
ductive Systems When lead firms make horizontal connec-
tions to governance actors in local productive systems that 
house ESN producers, such as NGOs, governance partners 
can work to address sustainability challenges within com-
munities or regions. While this type of project is often on 
a small scale, it can involve ongoing support from retailers 
and collaboration within local productive systems. A benefit 
of this approach is that it allows for an in-depth focus on 
targeted sustainability challenges. Projects involving hori-
zontal connections have greater potential to be developed 
in ways that take into account local dynamics. Considering 
production at the scale of local productive systems allows 
for an understanding that producers face multiple govern-
ance pressures including those felt vertically through con-
nections to multiple buyers along with those felt horizon-
tally within the local productive system in which they are 
located. Local governance systems have a balance between 
public, private and social governance (Gereffi and Lee 
2016) and often have civil society actors trying to address 
sustainability challenges that are felt locally.
The case study retailers are involved in several projects 
targeted at addressing local sustainability issues in India, 
including supporting schools or hospitals in communities 
where factories are located as well as supporting NGO 
projects that provide different types of training and sup-
port services for workers. The ways that retailers engage 
in non-sourcing connections differs between retailers much 
more than sourcing practices differ. Working with NGOs 
and MSIs, some retailers play leading roles in multiple 
sustainability-focused projects with involvement in design 
and implementation and others’ involvement is limited to 
financial contributions. While the scope of these projects 
can vary from being based in one community to large inter-
national projects, the bulk of projects involving connections 
with lower-tier producers in India are small scale.
One challenge with making direct non-sourcing horizon-
tal connections with local productive systems is being able 
to connect with key local governance actors. This can be 
difficult due to the diversity of governance systems across a 
complicated network and that some local productive systems 
may lack strong local governance actors who could be poten-
tial partners. Also, the diversity of local productive systems 
and sustainability challenges they experience, even between 
different local regions producing the same components, 
would make it very difficult for lead firms to scale up efforts 
that involve creating horizontal connections.
An example of a major project using horizontal con-
nections, which UK garment retailers have been involved 
in and which explicitly involves a consideration of global 
differences between local productive systems, is the Better 
Cotton Initiative (BCI). This large MSI works on promot-
ing sustainable cotton worldwide and has branch offices in 
cotton-producing regions. Local affiliates work directly on 
the ground to train farmers to use more sustainable prac-
tices. The purpose of this programme is to create changes 
in farmers’ production practices in a way that addresses 
local sustainability challenges. The programme relies on 
attracting farmers to voluntarily participate in the support 
services they offer. Farmers enrolled in this programme are 
taught methods which are supposed to result in increased 
profit along with decreased environmental impact and bet-
ter working conditions.
Online Connections to  Suppliers Lead firms have 
also developed publicly available resources which are 
designed to directly reach lower-tier producers. For exam-
ple, New Look has developed the Textile Industry Sus-
tainability Platform (TISP), a multi-brand initiative that 
provides online resources for Chinese textile factories 
seeking to decrease their environmental impact. This is 
a free resource supported by seven leading global brands 
and three consultancy companies. The guide promotes 
the business case for energy efficiency, introduces energy 
management and provides examples of how firms have 
improved energy efficiency.
Five Mechanisms Employed in Buyer‑Led 
Governance for Sustainability
Cutting across approaches that use both vertical and hori-
zontal connections, a useful way to breakdown governance 
pressures is between those that create incentives for produc-
ers to voluntarily change behaviours and those that involve 
mandatory pressures. At some points in ESNs, mandatory 
enforcement is possible and at other points there may be 
no governance actors able to implement mandatory regula-
tions. Another issue is that the nature of some sustainability 
challenges can be resolved with simple changes and oth-
ers require more complex adaptation to businesses’ systems 
(Alexander 2018). Understanding that diverse sustainability 
challenges within an ESN may have different answers to 
these questions, leads to the need to employ multiple gov-
ernance approaches. In this context, lead firms’ emerging 
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attempts to provide governance for the diverse sustainability 
challenges across segments of their ESNs have begun to take 
different forms. Five model mechanisms can be identified 
through which retailers are attempting to play a role in gov-
ernance for sustainable production.
Hierarchical
The first mechanism, considered as Hierarchical, involves 
lead firms carrying out production themselves. This involves 
having complete control over the processes used. However, 
this is a strategy that is rarely employed by the case study 
retailers. A related example found in this case is when retail-
ers choose to work with vertically integrated suppliers. 
These producers have complete control over early stages of 
production.
Compliance
The second mechanism can be seen as actions fitting within 
Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen’s (2014) compliance para-
digm. This Compliance mechanism involves lead firms set-
ting standards and checking if suppliers are meeting them. 
This has been the most common approach for addressing 
issues related to working conditions in garment factories. 
An option for using a Compliance model with a horizontal 
approach could involve retailers partnering with key govern-
ance actors in a local productive system who could manage 
a compliance system.
The Compliance model can involve incentives or sanc-
tions. Scott (2014, p. 159) discusses the effectiveness of 
coercive models as depending on,
relatively clear demands, effective surveillance, and 
significant sanctions. Beyond this, it also matters 
whether the mechanisms employed are primarily those 
of power, involving imposition of authority—where 
the coercive agent is viewed as a legitimate agent of 
control—or rely on the use of threats or inducements.
These factors can be seen as important for the compliance 
model.
Existing uses of the Compliance approach face a num-
ber of challenges (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). A 
common problem is failing to consider differences in local 
productive systems (Bartley 2010). Mezzadri (2014) empha-
sises that diversity among India’s garment production cen-
tres creates unique challenges preventing universal compli-
ance programmes from being effective. Lower-tier producers 
in this case work in even more diverse local contexts.
Another concern is that compliance is a tool that buyers 
use to exert control over their suppliers. Using a Compliance 
approach can reinforce unequal balances of power between 
buyers and sellers (De Neve 2009; Mezzadri 2014). Forcing 
producers to use practices dictated by their buyers can lead 
to modified practices creating new sustainability challenges 
(Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010). Compliance systems can 
also lead to situations where suppliers actively try to evade 
inspectors or restructure systems in ways that exclude prac-
tices from inspections without actually alleviating sustain-
ability challenges.
A further challenge of the Compliance approach is that it 
is particularly difficult when compliance criteria are related 
to processes. In contrast to product requirements that can be 
observed, process standards require monitoring, which can 
be especially difficult when production does not take place at 
integrated sites. Monitoring to enforce process requirements 
can involve a variety of options, which include directly 
monitoring production activities, or relying on a lower tier 
supplier, third-party monitoring or supplier self-evaluation. 
Empirical studies have shown lead firms’ attempts to use 
the compliance model to influence first-tier suppliers have 
had limited effectiveness (Locke 2013; Barrientos and Smith 
2007).
Finally, the Compliance model faces challenges related 
to the high level of resources required. Retailers’ staff which 
are focused on enforcing codes of conduct for garment man-
ufacturers are currently struggling to successfully carry out 
this task. Expanding their role to include compliance for 
lower-tiers may result in spreading already limited resources 
too thin. A retailer representative involved in enforcing a 
compliance system cites the ongoing challenges in the first-
tier as a reason why retailers should not focus on lower-tier 
suppliers.
Our priority is to get our first-tier sorted out actually… 
For example, in India there are a lot of issues at the 
manufacturer’s level in terms of the contract labour 
and the exploitation that comes with the contract 
labour, the minimum wages, all that, so that becomes 
the priority for us. There’s no point in going to the 
second tier or the third tier when the first-tier is actu-
ally not compliant. So that’s a challenge (Retailer A, 
India-based CSR Manager).
A significantly higher number of businesses are involved 
in an entire ESN compared to the group that would be con-
sidered first-tier suppliers. Increased expenses involved in 
expanding compliance systems to lower tiers would not only 
be for the lead firms but also for lower-tier buyers and pro-
ducers which may be expected to invest in participating in 
certification systems.
Support Services
The third mechanism of Support Services can be seen as 
a component of Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen’s (2014) 
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cooperation paradigm as it involves more cooperation than 
the compliance model. This mechanism involves lead firms 
encouraging producers to use more sustainable processes 
through providing assistance.
The Support Services approach can involve a variety of 
instruments. These can range from forms of capacity build-
ing such as training sessions for management or workers 
to financial support for equipment upgrading. In terms of 
providing training, some retailers now have inductions for all 
suppliers, which can be offered in conjunction with a variety 
of ad hoc training and support programmes to first-tier sup-
pliers and their employees. Support services can also involve 
the creation of support materials which guide suppliers on 
how to fulfil requirements of codes of conduct. An example 
of how the Support Services model is being used through 
horizontal connections can be found in John Lewis’ involve-
ment with a financial literacy training programme in India.
A challenge with training programmes is that they can 
become tick-boxes for producers. In these cases, staff may 
attend training sessions but continue to use existing prac-
tices without incorporating the changes being promoted. A 
respondent in this study described that,
All big brands [are] paying for training… But the 
factories are having less interest in this type of train-
ing. Because… they are thinking that ‘I know every-
thing’… [It’s] the same fault with us, we were doing 
this [training]… [the factories] were thinking that if 
the manager will go for one day there will be a loss of 
work but they were not able to see the benefit of it in 
the long run…. because the brand is forcing, they are 
sending their staff for the training… They’re coming 
back [to their factories] and doing nothing but at least 
some is going. If you take some medicine and you 
vomit, not all will go out. Definitely some of the tablet 
will be inside your stomach (Auditing Firm B, India-
based Country Manager).
 In addition to formal training sessions, production staff can 
receive informal advice on how to improve systems. Amen-
gual (2010) describes informal methods through which 
inspectors inform staff in factories being inspected as to 
ways that other factories have met compliance requirements. 
This informal information sharing can be an effective way to 
improve production practices.
Partnership
The fourth mechanism is Partnership, which can also be 
seen as fitting within Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen’s (2014) 
cooperative paradigm. This approach involves lead firms 
working with producers to collaboratively address sustain-
ability challenges. An example of a partnership model can be 
found in the relationship between Retailer B and Composite 
Mill A discussed above.
The Partnership approach can be used directly within a 
buyer–supplier relationship or involve multiple partners. In 
the Partnership model, the priorities of multiple partners can 
be brought together. Soundararajan and Brown (2016) write 
about the benefits of finding shared value between buyers 
and suppliers. Initiatives which are related to motivations 
of both buyers and sellers may be able to tackle more com-
plicated sustainability challenges. Considering the potential 
conflict between garment manufacturers’ priorities com-
pared to their own, some retailers in this case are starting 
to develop more cooperative ways of addressing working 
conditions with their first-tier suppliers.
While partnerships, and particularly multi-stakeholder 
partnerships, seem to be a very promising model for address-
ing sustainability challenges they face several key obsta-
cles. One is that there may be problematic power imbalances 
between the partners (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). 
Another is that they can require a lot of effort to maintain. 
Considering the feasibility of developing partnerships with 
a broad set of first-tier suppliers, Lund-Thomsen and Lind-
green (2014, p. 17) noted,
The rhetoric surrounding cooperation sounds valid, but 
it is difficult to imagine how vast corporations such as 
Nike can realistically engage in close cooperation with 
more than 800 first- tier suppliers. Collaboration might 
be feasible with a few selected suppliers, engaged in 
pilot projects; it appears nearly impossible to replicate 
such close cooperation across hundreds of suppliers, 
considering just the logistical challenges.
Lead buyers seeking to make partnerships with producers 
involved in multiple stages of production would face an even 
larger challenge as this would involve significantly more 
businesses.
Promotion of Voluntary Change
A fifth mechanism is the Promotion of Voluntary Change. 
Through the Promotion of Voluntary Change approach, 
new or modified production practices can be promoted to 
producers at any point in an ESN, even in situations where 
buyers have very weak to no connections with producers. 
Lead firms can promote new practices through a variety of 
methods which can involve working directly with suppliers, 
having partners promote new practices or creating public 
campaigns.
Two of the horizontal governance scenarios described 
above can be seen as using the Promotion of Voluntary 
Change approach. BCI and TISP involve presenting ideas 
to producers which they can choose to incorporate into their 
businesses. Promotion of Voluntary Change can also take 
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place in vertical connections. One way for this to happen is 
when lead firms provide training programmes to first-tier 
suppliers that are designed to highlight practices that can 
voluntarily be adopted.
One challenge with this model is that addressing some 
sustainability challenges might not be in the producers’ best 
interests, such as those related to distributive issues (see 
Locke 2013) and may require external enforcement. Never-
theless, the Promotion of Voluntary Change approach may 
be particularly useful in local regions which do not have 
strong key governance actors, for reaching producers who 
are in the lower-tiers of an ESN or for broadly disseminat-
ing information related to an innovative sustainable practice.
Comparing Governance Paths 
and Mechanisms
Each of the governance paths and mechanisms has different 
strengths and weaknesses. Lead firms seeking to address 
sustainability challenges in their ESNs make decisions on 
what strategies to employ. This section discusses factors that 
can shape these decisions.
Vertical Versus Horizontal Approaches
In this case, vertical and horizontal approaches are both 
being used with some measures of success. However, both 
approaches face challenges for connecting with lower-tier 
producers. Hofstetter (2018) highlights the expense and 
difficulty of mapping entire ESNs and identifies two ways 
for lead firms to identify high-risk areas in complex ESNs. 
One is trying to follow vertical paths and focusing investi-
gation on particular areas of interest. The other, which is 
more aligned with horizontal approaches, is using economic 
trade data to gain an understanding of patterns. Ongoing 
technological developments are helping to facilitate new 
tracking systems.
Vertical approaches benefit from working with contrac-
tual relationships. However, these approaches may have lim-
ited reach and may not effectively promote change across 
local productive systems which have businesses selling 
to different types of buyers all contributing to a common 
problem. For instance, an issue related to pollution may not 
be well addressed with only a small portion of companies 
in the affected area receiving vertical pressure to change 
their waste management. Overall, vertical approaches can be 
enhanced by understanding that vertical pressures are felt in 
conjunction with horizontal pressures (Gereffi and Lee 2016; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2000).
Horizontal approaches can benefit from connecting to a 
larger set of producers. However, these producers may not 
actually be contributing to the lead firms’ ESNs. This may be 
better for addressing sustainability challenges but harder for 
lead firms to justify the use of resources. While horizontal 
connections to individual firms were not found in this study, 
lead firms could benefit from connecting to businesses which 
Yan et al. (2015) have referred to as nexus suppliers that play 
critical roles due to their inter-organisational ties.
Lead firm governance through both vertical and hori-
zontal pathways reaches producers working in distinct local 
regions. In these spaces, private governance can be seen as 
compensating for a deficit in public governance (Mayer and 
Gereffi 2010; Gereffi and Mayer 2006). While this is often 
the case, there are times when public and private governance 
can complement each other (Amengual 2010). Lead firms 
must deal with local challenges whether using vertical or 
horizontal approaches.
Comparing the Five Mechanisms for Promoting 
Sustainable Production
The five mechanisms identified for promoting sustainable 
production can be used in conjunction with each other but 
have a number of key differences. Major differences are the 
amount of power a lead firm needs to use each mechanism, 
suitability for different types of sustainability challenges, 
who defines sustainability and who enforces the use of sus-
tainable practices. Data collected indicate that in the UK 
garment industry, while the Compliance model dominated 
early attempts to govern for sustainability, the use of Support 
Services, Partnerships and Promotion of Voluntary Change 
has been expanding. Hierarchical production for the case 
study retailers is quite rare. However, measuring the exact 
prominence of each mechanism is not possible with the 
methods used in this study. An overview of key features 
of the five model mechanisms discussed can be found in 
Table 3.
Suitable Structure for Buyer–Seller Relationship
Governance actors need different levels of power for each 
mechanism. The first two mechanisms require some direct 
control over producers. The latter three approaches can be 
used in situations where governance actors do not have any 
direct control over producers.
Lead firms’ involvement in any of these strategies 
depends on their connections with producers. The Hierar-
chical approach requires vertically integrated production and 
involves complete power over production. The Compliance 
approach is supported through relationships that involve 
a strong role of buyer governance. This approach often 
requires having direct power over producers. However, it can 
involve lead firms with limited powers over producers align-
ing with other governance partners that do have power to 
enforce compliance. Alternatively, Compliance approaches 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































can be promoted as voluntary with producers deciding to 
join certification schemes in order to gain expected benefits. 
In this case, the approach could be considered a combina-
tion of the Compliance and Promotion of Voluntary Change 
models. Use of the Support Services mechanism can involve 
buyers having mandatory requirements for producers to par-
ticipate or can also be used in situations where producers 
feel that the Support Services are worthwhile. The Partner-
ship and Promotion of Voluntary Change models can be 
used in any relationship.
Ability to Address Different Forms of Sustainability 
Challenges and Potential Obstacles
Each mechanism has different potentials for addressing 
sustainability challenges and faces different potential obsta-
cles. Hierarchy can address any sustainability challenges and 
involves complete control. Compliance is better for straight-
forward challenges and difficult to apply for complex chal-
lenges. Support Services are suitable for any sustainability 
challenges. However, a challenge in cases where resolving 
a sustainability challenge requires behaviour change, is that 
receivers of support may not change their practices. Partner-
ships are particularly useful for complex challenges but a dif-
ficulty can be power imbalances between partners. The Pro-
motion of Voluntary Change model is beneficial for reaching 
producers in hard to connect to parts of ESNs. However, it is 
seen as being best suited to simple challenges. A weakness 
of this mechanism is that it can result in changes that do not 
address the sustainability challenge being targeted.
It is important to consider how potential alternate pro-
duction practices can address sustainability challenges. Just 
creating a blanket policy saying producers need to change 
“x” behaviour can create unexpected consequences. Identify-
ing forms of governance that are compatible with producers’ 
local experiences of multiple governance pressures can be 
more useful.
The prevailing structure of productive systems may be 
based on historical trajectories and may not be in the ongo-
ing best interests of producers and other actors (Wilkinson 
2003). In these cases, promoting change can be more accept-
able to producers. In some cases, this can be related to the 
introduction of new technologies.
A representative from a retailer discussed the need for 
using multiple approaches to governance for sustainabil-
ity. He described challenges with relying on a Compliance 
model for complex challenges and the potential benefits of 
using the Support Services and Partnership models.
Unfortunately, we’ve pushed auditing… but… the key 
issues that needed to be dealt with: worker-manage-
ment dialogue, freedom of association, wages, etc., 
auditing has just never had the capacity to deal with 
those. Those are the kind of [issues] where you’re not 
able to pick it up on a checklist. Auditing is like a 
60 billion dollar business a year… Yet, if you look 
at the impacts in the last 10  years, it’s been very 
minimal, very!… [Retailer A] has been at the fore-
front of this saying, “go beyond auditing”… there’s a 
lot of issues… that will never be properly addressed 
because they’ve never been able to be picked up and 
the only way you’re going to be able to resolve those 
is to ensure that the responsibility goes back into the 
workplace, for the workers and the management, to 
be able to negotiate effectively… giving workers the 
skills, the training, awareness and management the 
skills and training for being able to work with each 
other to address the issues within the factory but also 
to have mature industrial relations… instead of just 
getting a third party to go and visit a factory… We’re 
building the relationships more with the unions and the 
NGOs and the other industry players, saying, “look, 
you know, you need to have the right management 
systems, workers need to have a grievance procedure, 
etc.” but… it can’t be that somebody just gives you 
a management system handbook and says put that in 
your factory… It has to be done properly and there 
has to be buy-in… I would say, we’ve let the workers 
down quite a lot because in auditing, we promised a 
lot but delivered very little (Retailer A, UK-based CSR 
Manager).
However, it is not always clear what mechanisms may be 
best to address a particular challenge. While challenges that 
are based on physical technology may be less connected to 
deeper culturally embedded practices and easier to address, 
Bartley (2010) points out that it is not a clear distinction 
between social challenges being complex and environmental 
challenges being simple and ‘technical’.
For sustainability challenges which involve high levels of 
pressure to maintain current practices (sticky challenges), 
higher levels of cooperation and deliberation involving mul-
tiple stakeholders may be necessary to develop new systems 
which actually address these challenges. This is particularly 
important as externally driven pressures to address these 
challenges can just push the problematic behaviour out of 
sight.
Development and Implementation of Interventions
Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) draw attention to the con-
trast between who defines governance interventions and 
who enforces them. There are multiple possibilities across 
the five mechanisms. For Hierarchical, Compliance, Sup-
port Services and the Promotion of Voluntary Change mod-
els, there is potential for multiple actors to be involved in 
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developing an intervention. This can range from lead firms 
internally setting priorities to broad stakeholder consulta-
tions. The only model that specifically involves producers in 
developing a strategy is the Partnership model. Partnership 
approaches are developed and implemented by members of 
the partnership. However, in practice, some partnerships 
involve relationships, with high power differentials, that 
do not actually allow all partners to contribute to designing 
strategies.
Often civil society groups are drivers for addressing 
sustainability challenges. A representative from a retailer’s 
India-based code of conduct team spoke about the potential 
for NGOs to shape the firms’ sustainability agenda, “It does 
happen that NGOs will come and approach us and they will 
say, ‘we’re doing’, let’s say ‘child labour eradication from 
the supply chain, so would you be interested’ and then we 
would deal with the proposals (Retailer A, India-based CSR 
Manager)”. However, in many cases NGOs have been unable 
to stimulate change. Despite input from multiple stakehold-
ers, often lead firms decide what type of sustainability issues 
they want to address and what approach they want to use.
Implementation strategies are based on the type of mech-
anism. Implementation of the Compliance and Support 
Services models can involve the buyer or public or private 
service providers. The actors involved in implementing a 
plan developed through a partnership would depend on the 
design of the strategy developed. Producers are responsible 
for implementing practices encouraged through the Promo-
tion of Voluntary Change model.
Enforcement mechanisms differ greatly across these 
mechanisms. In the Hierarchical model, the lead firm 
designs production systems and hires people whose job 
responsibilities include working within these systems. In 
the Compliance model, lead firms, private third-parties, 
government monitors or even supplier self-evaluation can 
be responsible for ensuring the producers meets the required 
standards. In the Support Services model, there is often little 
enforcement over whether the new skills or technology are 
actually integrated into a producer’s systems. In the Partner-
ship model, each actor could be responsible for themselves 
or a monitoring system could be developed, depending on 
the strategy used in the partnership. In the Promotion of Vol-
untary Change model, changes by producers are not enforced 
by outside actors.
Choice of Path and Mechanism
A key factor when choosing an approach is the nature of 
the challenge a lead firm is seeking to address. Multiple 
methods exist for identifying sustainability challenges in 
ESNs (Guinée et al. 2011; Kühnen and Hahn 2018). The 
firms in this study seem to have an ad hoc approach in the 
choice of challenges they seek to remediate. Often actions 
are reactions to stories in the media or pressure from NGOs. 
Carter and Rogers (2008) highlight the importance of busi-
nesses taking into account economic, social and environ-
mental factors when they seek to have SSCM, noting that 
much research focuses on social and environmental aspects. 
To develop globally sustainable production systems, opera-
tionalising systemic methods for identifying pressing chal-
lenges caused by activities in ESNs is an important step. A 
key consideration in this process is who defines the nature 
of the challenges as these can be seen differently by diverse 
stakeholders (Alexander 2018).
Mechanism choice is dependent on lead firms’ power over 
producers. Power is shaped by the relationship between the 
buyers and suppliers along with the firms’ network locations 
and consequently how much pressure exists to maintain cur-
rent practices vs. the difficulties that would be involved in 
changing current practices. Lead firms with high power over 
their top-tier suppliers have been able to enforce straight for-
ward changes through the Compliance mechanism. However, 
lead firms using this model have had more difficulty promot-
ing changes that require more complex behavioural shifts. 
When looking at governance of lower-tiers, lead firms may 
have less power to mandate and persuasive approaches may 
need to be considered.
Combining governance mechanisms can be beneficial in 
some situations. Evidence has been found that combining 
the Compliance model with the Support Services model 
through running capacity building programmes simultane-
ously to implementing codes of conduct can address limi-
tations of approaches purely based on compliance (Locke 
2013). A study by De Marchi et al. (2013) finds that mentor-
ing approaches, which can be considered as a combination 
of Support Services and Partnership, may be a good choice 
when suppliers are smaller and cannot afford certification. 
The study also showed a benefit of this approach can be 
enabling the co-development of environmental innovations.
Additionally, for any of the mechanisms, support from 
intermediaries may be needed. As new approaches develop, 
new forms of intermediaries can develop. This has already 
been the case for Compliance and Support Services, which 
have been popular approaches that now involve many spe-
cialised external service providers, such as social auditors. 
Jooste and Scott (2011) describe the creation of enabling 
fields which can connect potential intermediaries with exist-
ing skills to new initiatives that can benefit from these skills. 
Additionally, De Marchi and Grandinetti (2013) find that 
external knowledge, accessed through universities, research 
institutions and competitors, can play a large role for innova-
tions related to sustainable production.
Another consideration is that lead firms facing pressures 
to produce sustainably can seek to change the structure of 
their networks. Related decisions can involve the processes 
outlined in the transaction cost economics model. In recent 
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decades many firms made decisions to outsource. These 
decisions have led to current systems involving many sus-
tainability challenges, such as production taking place in 
countries with weak or weakly enforced labour and environ-
mental regulations. As sustainability considerations begin to 
play a larger part in lead firms’ decision making, it remains 
to be seen how this will affect connections with suppliers.
However, lead firms’ ability to change the structure of 
ESNs may be limited. Considered as CASs, these large and 
complex networks cannot be directly controlled. Lead firms’ 
market-based decisions involve rapidly changing product 
offerings which necessitate relying on numerous producers 
with various specialties. Many lead firms are actively trying 
to reduce the sizes of their supplier bases. However, even 
with dramatic reductions (see Schüßler et al. 2018)|compa-
nies in the case study still have hundreds of first-tier suppli-
ers supported by networks of thousands of lower-tier sup-
pliers. Attempting to make targeted changes within these 
networks can involve a lot of uncertainty.
Synergies may exist between lead firms’ sourcing prac-
tices and the type of governance for sustainability in which 
they engage. Lead firms which engage in process monitoring 
to ensure quality standards can more easily incorporate mon-
itoring related to codes of conduct as these buyers already 
have a presence in their suppliers’ factories. For lead firms 
that do not directly monitor production and for stages of 
production that do not involve custom-made products, cur-
rent relationships between buyers and suppliers may be weak 
or non-existent. These sourcing models may be less condu-
cive to developing partnerships or even providing support 
services.
Multiple frameworks provided by SSCM literature can be 
used to aid in choosing how to promote sustainable produc-
tion. Notably, Tachizawa and Wong (2014) identify contin-
gency variables that shape the approaches lead firms take as: 
power, stakeholder pressure, industry, material criticality, 
dependency, distance and knowledge resources. Addition-
ally, the four groups of MT-SSCM critical success factors 
proposed by Grimm et al. (2014) can be used to evaluate 
potential interventions. The first group is  lead firm-related 
or internal, which includes the lead firm having knowledge 
about its supply chain. The second group is relationship-
related, which includes lead firm buyer-power (over direct 
supplier), direct supplier buyer-power (over sub-supplier), 
trust between the lead firm and the direct supplier, trust 
between the direct supplier and the sub-supplier and the 
existence of a committed long-term relationship between the 
direct supplier and the sub-supplier. The third group is sup-
ply chain partner-related, which includes the direct suppli-
er’s willingness to disclose sub-suppliers, involvement of 
the direct supplier, perceived value for the direct supplier, 
perceived value for the sub-supplier, low risk of supplier-
by-passing (involving the lead firm cutting out the direct 
supplier and sourcing directly from the sub-supplier, also 
known as disintermediation) and the sub-supplier’s capa-
bility to comply with requested sustainability standards. 
Finally, the fourth group is context-related, which includes 
geographical distance between supply chain partners and 
cultural distance between supply chain partners. They note 
that further research is needed to better understand how 
dynamics of these factors can lead to success.
Also notable is the multi-level framework developed by 
Sauer and Seuring (2018), which is designed for choosing 
between Tachizawa and Wong’s (2014) MT-SSCM prac-
tices. Three drivers of uncertainty in lead firm’s relation-
ships with suppliers are identified in the framework. First, 
members of an ESN experience pressure from being in the 
network and from their local environments (vertical and 
horizontal pressures). Second, the lead firm has uncertainty 
in maintaining secure supply. Third, suppliers experience 
demand uncertainty. Levels for these three types of uncer-
tainty are measured as low or high to identify eight model 
situations that can guide the type of practice a lead firm 
should use for MT-SSCM.
While forms of buyer-driven governance are fundamen-
tally shaped by behaviour of lead firms, in order to really 
address sustainability challenges more voice needs to be 
given to actors in lower-tiers, who may be the ones facing 
the consequences of sustainability challenges. Different 
industries currently face varying pressures related to raw 
material sustainability. However, as these issues tend to be 
driven by scandals, any industry could be the next one to 
face public pressure. Proactive lead firms can assess activi-
ties in their own supplier networks to determine where key 
challenges lie and base their actions on the needs of the 
people working in their ESNs and the communities affected 
by their practices.
Conclusion
The governance for sustainability model presented in this 
paper helps to explain the current and potential roles that 
can be played by lead firms seeking to promote sustainable 
practices across fragmented production processes. Key past 
lead buyer governance models have viewed the role of lead 
buyers differently. In the buyer-driven model, lead firms are 
seen to control access to major resources (Gereffi 1994). 
In the Gereffi et al. (2005) governance model, lead firms 
are seen as playing different roles depending on features of 
transactions. The modular approach developed by Ponte and 
Sturgeon (2014) identifies the potential for variable levels 
of power by lead buyers but does not identify the diversity 
of roles played by lead buyers. Finally, Lund-Thomsen and 
Lindgreen (2014) consider specific strategies used by lead 
firms seeking to address challenges related to sustainable 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































production found in first-tier suppliers. The approaches to 
buyer-driven governance identified in this study provide a 
different way to think about buyer-led governance than these 
key past approaches (see Table 4). This article presents lead 
firms’ role in governance for sustainable production as a 
multi-faceted process. From this perspective, one lead firm 
has the potential to play multiple, simultaneous governance 
roles.
Five model mechanisms are identified as Hierarchical, 
Compliance, Support Services, Partnership and the Promo-
tion of Voluntary Change. The mechanisms are not mutually 
exclusive and are often combined within one strategy. The 
approaches available to lead firms depend on their relation-
ships with producers along with the nature of the sustain-
ability challenge being faced. The mechanisms can involve 
both vertical and horizontal ties. Each pathway has different 
benefits. Strengthening or shortening vertical connections 
can be seen as a way to reduce risk created by outsourcing. 
Creating horizontal connections can be seen as a way to 
reach broad groups of producers that are not easily acces-
sible through vertical pathways.
Empirically, this study has found that, while retailers 
currently do not play a large role in governance for sustain-
ability across this case study, this role is expanding. Work-
ing through both vertical and horizontal connections, retail-
ers are connecting to producers in diverse local productive 
systems by developing cooperative relationships with other 
governance actors and using a variety of approaches for pro-
moting changes to production practices.
Considering the five mechanisms identified in this case 
and the two types of pathways discussed can help provide 
insight for buyer-driven industries beginning to engage in 
promoting sustainability in their production processes. This 
study emphasises that there are many ways to address sus-
tainability concerns outside of the dominant compliance 
approach. It also shows that multiple approaches can be 
pursued in parallel by individual lead firms facing diverse 
sustainability challenges in their ESNs.
Limitations
This study is limited by focusing on one industry in one 
period of time. Additionally, as the network studied is large 
and diverse, the empirical material only provides a small 
glimpse of what is happening across the entire network. 
However, the practices and processes identified allow for 
the development of a model that can be applied to future 
cases in order to be refined.
Future Research
As sustainability challenges in global production processes 
present an ongoing problem, more research is needed to bet-
ter understand the role that lead firms can play in promoting 
sustainable practices. Subsequent studies could benefit from 
considering additional sectors and country contexts. Further 
research could involve an in-depth exploration of how firms 
choose approaches, the prevalence of their use and their 
effectiveness. An area of particular concern is questioning 
the types of impact that international firms can have on local 
communities (Kolk and Lenfent 2018).
Another interesting area to consider is how lead firms 
progress in developing new approaches. Kim and Davis 
(2016) note that initial engagement in CSR can shape future 
behaviour. They highlight that previous studies have found 
that firms that adopt CSR practices can continue developing 
these practices even if they have initially introduced aspects 
of CSR solely for symbolic purposes (Kelly and Dobbin 
1998) and that firms publically regarded as having high lev-
els of CSR are treated harshly if their reputations are dam-
aged (King and McDonnell 2015). Another issue is whether 
new approaches adopted by some lead firms lead to broader 
industry-wide changes due to mimetic processes (Zhu and 
Sarkis 2007). A longitudinal study on firms’ strategies for 
CSR in supplier networks could provide more insight into 
these dynamics.
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